The case for cloud service trustmarks and assurance-as-a-service by Lynn, Theo et al.
The Case for Cloud Service Trustmarks and Assurance-as-a-Service 
 Theo Lynn, Philip Healy, Richard McClatchey, John Morrison, Claus Pahl and Brian Lee 
Irish Centre for Cloud Computing & Commerce, Dublin, Ireland 
theo.lynn@dcu.ie, p.healy@cs.ucc.ie, richard.mcclatchey@uwe.ac.uk, j.morrison@cs.ucc.ie, 
cpahl@computing.dcu.ie, blee@ait.ie  
Keywords: Cloud: Assurance: Accountability: Trustmark 
Abstract: Cloud computing represents a significant economic opportunity for Europe. However, this growth is 
threatened by adoption barriers largely related to trust. This position paper examines trust and confidence 
issues in cloud computing and advances a case for addressing them through the implementation of a novel 
trustmark scheme for cloud service providers. The proposed trustmark would be both active and dynamic 
featuring multi-modal information about the performance of the underlying cloud service. The trustmarks 
would be informed by live performance data from the cloud service provider, or ideally an independent 
third-party accountability and assurance service that would communicate up-to-date information relating to 
service performance and dependability. By combining assurance measures with a remediation scheme, 
cloud service providers could both signal dependability to customers and the wider marketplace and provide 
customers, auditors and regulators with a mechanism for determining accountability in the event of failure 
or non-compliance. As a result, the trustmarks would convey to consumers of cloud services and other 
stakeholders that strong assurance and accountability measures are in place for the service in question and 
thereby address trust and confidence issues in cloud computing. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Surveys of consumers and enterprises have 
consistently highlighted concerns about entrustment 
of data to cloud service providers. The extent to 
which these concerns are exaggerated is open to 
debate. Regardless, their very existence limits cloud 
uptake. Section 1.1 reviews the evidence for trust 
concerns around cloud computing and examines 
their subjects and scope. 
 Accountability measures have been proposed as a 
means of enhancing the trustworthiness of cloud 
offerings. Although this approach includes 
preventative aspects, it is characterised by the 
assigning of liability in the event of failure through 
detective measures and subsequent remediation, if 
appropriate. Assurance, in contrast, is concerned 
with conclusions designed to enhance the degree of 
confidence of the intended users other than the cloud 
service provider about the outcome of an evaluation 
or measurement, typically of dependability and 
predictability, of a cloud computing service. Section 
1.2 provides an overview of accountability and 
assurance concepts as they apply to cloud computing 
and considers the similarities and differences 
between them. 
A trustmark is a third-party mark, logo, picture, or 
symbol that is presented in an effort to dispel 
consumers’ concerns about risk. A well-known 
example is the VeriSign (now Norton) Trust Seal, 
which indicates to users of a website that its 
authenticity and security practices have been 
independently verified. Section 2 presents the case 
for trustmarks as a confidence-building measure in 
the trustworthiness of cloud services.  This 
reasoning is extended in Section 2.1 to include the 
notion of an “active” and “dynamic” trustmark that 
incorporate multi-modal display of up-to-date 
information about the dependability of the 
underlying service rather than the traditional notion 
of trustmarks as static and passive badge-like 
entities. 
The utility of a trustmark is dependent on the 
independent verification procedures that it 
represents. Section 3 outlines how an assurance 
service could be implemented that would provide 
transparency to consumers of cloud services, and 
other stakeholders, that appropriate assurance and 
accountability procedures are being followed by a 
cloud service provider. This information could be 
surfaced to consumers and other stakeholders via a 
the revised trustmark concept described in Section 
2.1. 
 We conclude in Section 4 with a summary of the 
proposed concepts (trustmarks and assurance 
services) and a discussion of how these could be 
turned into concrete implementations, and a set of 
objective measures for success. 
 
1.1 Barriers to Cloud Adoption 
A recent study carried out by IDC on behalf of DG 
Connect of the European Commission recently 
reported that more than half of EU businesses and 
consumers are using some form of cloud computing 
service today and suggested cloud computing could 
contribute up to €250 billion to EU GDP in 2020 
and create over 3.8 million jobs (IDC, 2012). 
Despite these relatively high adoption rates, the 
same report highlights that cloud adoption by 
business users is currently higher for "basic" 
solutions and cloud intensity (measured as the 
number of cloud solutions adopted by each 
enterprise) is also rather limited. The impact of these 
two factors is that the potential value of spending 
activity on public clouds is reduced by up to 56% 
(IDC, 2012). 
The barriers causing this limited cloud adoption 
behaviour are well documented and cluster around 
five areas. Both consumers and enterprises have 
concerns over the location, integrity, portability, 
security and privacy of their data in the cloud (HBR 
Analytics, 2010; Yankee Group, 2010; Pew Internet 
(2010); IDC (2012)). Regulatory responses to these 
concerns are resulting in increasing complexity with 
different compliance requirements across industry 
sectors and legal jurisdictions. These trust and 
compliance complexity issues are further 
exacerbated by the nature of businesses operating in 
the cloud, often characterised by a chain of service 
provision and trans-border data transfers. 
Governance issues, data loss and leakage, and shared 
technology vulnerabilities are amongst the top 
threats to cloud computing identified by independent 
international organisations (Cloud Security Alliance, 
2010). 
Recently, the European Commission suggested a 
series of actions to overcome some of these barriers 
through (i) opening up access to content, (ii) making 
online and cross-border transactions straightforward 
and (iii) building digital confidence (European 
Commission, 2012). With regards to cloud 
computing, the European Commission is more 
specific about the need for “a chain of confidence-
building steps to create trust in cloud solutions.” 
These steps include actions to: 
 promote wider use of standards, the 
certification of cloud services to show 
they meet these standards and the 
endorsement of such certificates by 
regulatory authorities; 
 develop model terms for cloud computing 
service level agreements and standardised 
contract terms and conditions for various 
use scenarios including business-to-
business, business-to-consumer and trans-
border business; and, 
 promote common public sector leadership 
through a European Cloud Partnership to 
work on common procurement 
requirements for cloud computing. 
(European Commission, 2012) 
Addressing these challenges is not trivial. Digital 
business ecosystems built on chains of service 
provisions, such as those underlying cloud 
computing, introduce different issues that can 
undermine trustworthiness and dependability. 
These include provenance of data and technology, 
transparency about the operation and 
implementation of technology, and processes and 
the predictability of the technology to behave 
within expected norms (i.e., dependability) 
(Sommerville, 2007). Mechanisms to instil 
trustworthiness and dependability in cloud 
computing may include: 
 new approaches to constructing 
dependability arguments; 
 methods and tools for testing cloud 
infrastructures and configurations; 
 self-aware systems that make information 
about their operation and failure available 
for scrutiny and use; and, 
 regulatory and social mechanisms to 
highlight dependable and trustworthy 
service providers; and 
 de-emphasise or remove undependable 
and untrustworthy elements of the chain 
of service provision (Somerville, 2007). 
1.2 Accountability and Assurance 
Accountability has been proposed as a potential 
solution for addressing the deficit in trust and 
confidence in cloud computing (Pearson et al., 2012; 
Ko et al., 2011; Pearson and Charlesworth, 2009; 
Haeberlen, 2010). For example, the A4Cloud project 
proposes that a chain of accountability for data in the 
cloud can be established to provide users, cloud 
providers and regulators together to clarify liability 
 and provide greater transparency overall (Pearson et 
al., 2012). It is envisaged that this will be achieved 
by a set of mechanisms that may mitigate risk 
(preventative controls), monitor and identify risk and 
policy violation (detective controls), manage 
incidents and provide redress (corrective controls). 
The projects typically focus on scenarios involving a 
priori contracts between parties and as such do not 
serve to address trust and confidence issues in the 
wider marketplace but are restricted to those party to 
the service level agreement. 
  
Accountability may be defined as: “The property of 
a system or system resource that ensures that the 
actions of a system entity may be traced uniquely to 
that entity, which can then be held responsible for its 
actions” (Huff, 1981 as cited in IETF RFC4949). 
Assurance is different. It is concerned with 
conclusions by practitioners designed to enhance the 
degree of confidence of the intended users other than 
the responsible party about the outcome of an 
evaluation or measurement of a subject matter 
against criteria (adapted from International 
Framework of Assurance Engagements, IAASB, 
2008). One might argue that it is not ab initio 
focussed on failure and liability but rather focussed 
on dependability and, given sufficient time and 
repetition, predictability. The benefits of assurance 
include: 
 an independent opinion from an external 
source that enhances credibility of the 
cloud service; 
 reduction of perceived management bias in 
service claims; 
 improved relevance of information 
associated with the expertise and 
knowledge of the assurance provider; and, 
 modification of perceived risk. 
While accountability in cloud computing is focussed 
on provenance and transparency, it does not 
adequately address predictability in the way that 
assurance can. The natural extension of an 
assurance-based approach to cloud computing is a 
Design for Dependability (in contrast to a Design for 
Failure) model that integrates both fault avoidance 
and fault tolerance. It should be noted that 
assurance, unlike accountability, need not be 
absolute given the limitations and uncertainties 
inherent in the chain of service provision and the 
impracticality of examining all evidence associated 
with any given cloud computing service but it may 
be reasonable given an accumulation of evidence. 
We posit that an integrated approach to 
accountability and assurance is needed for cloud 
computing.  
 
A proposed integrated framework is presented in 
Figure 1 that extends and realigns the Pearson and 
Wainwright (2012) Framework for Accountability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 An Integrated Framework for Assurance and Accountability (an adaptation of Pearson and Wainwright, 2012) 
 
2. THE CASE FOR CLOUD 
TRUSTMARKS 
The issues around trust raised by the advent of cloud 
computing are similar to those raised by the Internet 
as a whole. Consumers of cloud computing, like 
general Internet consumers, must trust that cloud 
service providers will not default on implied or 
explicit bonds, that the service quality is good and 
will be delivered as promised, and that their personal 
information will be securely held and their privacy 
respected (Aiken and Boush, 2006).  
 
Trustmarks are any third-party mark, logo, picture, 
or symbol that is presented in an effort to dispel 
consumers’ concerns about risk and therefore 
increase firm-specific trust levels (Aiken and Boush, 
2003). Trustmark services typically involve one or 
more of six elements: (i) a declaration of best 
practice, (ii) a subscription to a code of conduct, (iii) 
scrutiny for membership (based on criteria), (iv) 
sanctions for failure to adhere to a code of conduct, 
(v) recourse (appeals) for wrongful revocation of the 
trustmark and (vi) a remedy for aggrieved customers 
(Endeshaw, 2001). Policymakers, academia and 
industry have called for research on trustmarks in 
the cloud computing context (IAMCP, 2011; GAP 
Task Force, 2011; Robinson et al., 2010). Research 
suggests that trustmarks have the greatest effect on 
perceived trustworthiness in an Internet context 
(when compared to objective source third-party 
ratings and advertising-derived implications), 
influencing respondents’ beliefs about security and 
privacy, general beliefs about firm trustworthiness, 
and willingness to provide personal information 
(Aiken and Boush, 2006). Recipients of trustmarks 
are typically subject to a manual verification and 
certification process that varies widely within the 
trustmark provision sector and is not transparent to 
cloud customers and consumers. Trustmarks have 
been criticised for consistency, reliability, currency / 
timeliness, accuracy, transparency and ease of abuse 
(Schouten, 2012; Endeshaw, 2001; Remotti, 2012). 
Trustmarks are widely used in e-commerce 
(Remotti, 2012). We posit that existing static passive 
conceptualisations of trustmarks will not 
satisfactorily address the trust and confidence issues 
in cloud computing due to the inherently dynamic 
nature of these services. As such, we propose an 
active dynamic trustmark system for cloud 
computing that overcomes the shortfalls of 
accountability, assurance and trustmarks as discrete 
solutions for trustworthiness issues in cloud 
computing. 
 
2.1 Active Dynamic Trustmarks 
As noted above, trustmarks are typically presented 
as a static visual representation, typically a badge-
like logo, on websites or promotional material. 
However, trustmarks need not be static; by utilising 
modern web technologies, such as HTML 5, 
trustmarks could be presented as active dynamic 
entities that succinctly communicate up-to-date 
values for a number of high-level dependability 
measures. These dependability measures would be 
based on “live” analytics of aspects of the 
underlying service. Static badge-like images could 
be replaced by multi-modal entities that 
communicate information (i) graphically using 
lightweight, standard-compliant technologies such as 
HTML 5 canvas (ii) textually and (iii) in a machine 
readable format via semantic web technologies such 
as OWL. Furthermore, the authenticity of these 
trustmarks can be verified by a certification 
mechanism. Unlike the opaque assurance-backed 
certification approach that has been traditionally 
applied to trustmarks, active dynamic trustmarks 
would provide prospective and existing cloud 
customers with a window into the operation of the 
underlying cloud service by providing a mechanism 
that would allow users to “drill down” into  specific 
high-level metrics, at that moment or over a period 
of time, that comprise the trustmark.  As a result, 
stakeholders can satisfy themselves that the service 
is both trustworthy and dependable and the level of 
trustworthiness is signalled to the market as a whole.   
The design of the trustmark interface would need to 
balance the need to inform stakeholders with varying 
roles against privacy and security concerns. Discrete 
independent virtualised services could be provided 
for internal and external auditors and regulators to 
analyse service performance against business policy, 
legal or regulatory compliance requirements.  
 
3. ASSURANCE-AS-A-SERVICE 
To deliver the real-time metrics communicated by 
the active dynamic trustmarks, as proposed in 
Section 2.1, necessitates the collection, collation and 
computation of data relating to the operation of the 
 service. These metrics must be re-evaluated on an 
ongoing basis with the resulting data being 
communicated to the trustmark metadata platform 
before being surfaced via multi-modal trustmark 
updates. This task could be delivered by the cloud 
service provider or offloaded to an independent 
third-party assurance service, which could itself be a 
cloud service. In its primary capacity, the assurance 
service would watch the operation of other cloud 
services and surface data to the trustmark interface. 
One approach to services monitoring could be the 
declaration and confirmation of processes that 
describe the flow of execution of the processes that 
make up a cloud service. The service being assured 
would then communicate the commencement and 
completion of actions via web service calls to a 
checkpointing mechanism. Checkpointing would 
serve two purposes: (a) the creation of an 
independent provenance log of actions performed 
and their context (who, what, when, where), 
providing a basis for assurance monitoring and (b) 
the steering of processes and intervention where 
appropriate.  
If the declared processes were sufficiently fine-
grained, then large volumes of heterogeneous data 
could be created at rates beyond the monitoring and 
analytical capabilities of cloud consumers.  
Furthermore, consumers should be notified of 
dependability events without continuous monitoring 
of the trustmark. This shortcoming could be 
addressed by providing a mechanism that would 
continuously monitor provenance logs on behalf of 
consumers through the use of software components 
that represent the interests of the various internal and 
external, direct and indirect, stakeholders. 
Integrating these mechanisms with a hive of 
software agents would ease the monitoring and 
auditing burden on stakeholders by encoding their 
rules and ensuring that they are enforced on an 
ongoing basis. Furthermore, agents could also 
automatically trigger detective, preventative and 
remediation activities where appropriate. Moni- 
toring would therefore not simply be about 
identifying and laying the blame for faults and 
transgressions (accountability); it would actively try 
to engage with service providers, consumers and 
other stakeholders to confirm quality of service and 
where necessary identify, prevent and resolve issues 
in a transparent fashion while signalling its 
effectiveness or otherwise at doing this in a 
transparent fashion (assurance). 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Trustmarks have a proven track record in addressing 
the internet-related trust concerns held by 
consumers. They therefore may have a role to play 
in addressing the deficit in trust that has been 
identified in users’ attitude towards cloud services.  
However, trustmarks need not be static badge-like 
entities. Modern web technologies allow for the 
multimodal communication of a range of up-to-date 
metrics, allowing the trustmark concept to be 
expanded to become a much richer communications 
medium. These active dynamic trustmarks could be 
backed by third party assurance services that 
communicate dependability metrics to the trustmark 
platform. 
 
The success of the independent third-party assurance 
services, as proposed, would depend on their ability 
to meet the following objectives: 
 
1. enabling cloud service providers to give 
their consumers appropriate control and 
transparency over the definition and 
execution of their processes and workflows 
within cloud services; 
2. assuring cloud consumers that the processes 
and workflows as defined were executed in 
accordance with their declared 
expectations; 
3. monitoring and confirming consistent 
predictable compliance of cloud service 
providers with their clients’ declared 
expectations, business policies, regulations 
and third-party standards;  
4. providing a mechanism for verifying the 
integrity of the provenance chain without 
learning details of individual records; and 
5. signalling dependability and 
trustworthiness of cloud service providers 
to stakeholders using an agreed set of 
measures through an objective trustmark 
service. 
 
In summary, it is posited that a Design for 
Dependability model of cloud computing, supported 
by an independent third-party assurance system that 
recognises and communicates consistent predictable 
service through an independent active and dynamic 
trustmark, would improve trustworthiness and 
confidence in cloud computing and serve to 
differentiate cloud service providers. 
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